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Abstract 
The height of the inventive step is critical in balancing the costs and benefits of patent 
systems. This empirical analysis assesses this, using the economic yardstick of how 
much new knowledge is required for patent grant. But examiners and courts ask a 
different question – is it obvious? This creates a much lower standard, reinforced by 
continual amendment, semantic minutiae and the suggestion doctrine for 
combinations. The result is that many granted patents contribute no new knowledge 
and therefore no benefits to offset their costs. Such a low inventive step likely impedes 
rather than encourages innovation. 
Introduction 
The theoretically optimal standard for what should be granted patents ─ only 
"inventions that need the patent incentive",1 ─ is impossible to administer. The fall-
back is the inventive step, which bears the largest part of the weight in balancing the 
benefits of patent systems against their costs. Unfortunately little has been done to 
ensure that the inventive step is set at an appropriate height.  
There are many criticisms that the inventive step in the patent system is low. Pilch, 
Bakels and Hugenholtz argue the EPO guidelines mean that only rarely will a trivial 
invention fail the test.2 Dreyfuss notes that US statute law focuses on processes for 
assessing inventiveness, but does not discuss how much inventiveness should be 
required.3 Lunney documents some of the reasons for the very low height of the non-
obviousness test in the USA,4 and Quillen and Blonder provide more in-depth evidence 
on this.5 Lawson argues that in Australia the High Court "has lowered the quantum to 
almost a per se rule so that the quality of obviousness will almost never be relevant in 
assessing patentability."6 
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The empirical study reported here uses an in-depth analysis of the interactions 
between applicants and patent attorneys to throw further light on the "plethora of 
rules and presumptions" identified by the US Federal Trade Commission as responsible 
for the grant of many obvious patents.7 The very low height of the inventive step 
derives from a set of detailed rules each biased towards grant. The cumulative effect 
of these rules for the economic goals of the patent system is seriously concerning. 
There is no benefit to a nation in granting patents for uninventive inventions.  
The study: case selection and methodology 
The data used in the study are a set of business method patents originally accepted for 
grant in Australia, though each case is also traced through parallel applications at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and European Patent Office (EPO). 
Business methods were selected both because their content aligned with the author's 
knowledge base and because they are more accessible to a wider audience than 
genuine technology fields. Cases were selected from all Australian applications filed in 
the years 2003 to 2006 and accepted for grant by 1 July 2007.8 At that point in time the 
cases were a universe – all acceptances from filings during these four years. The choice 
of this approach was based on a desire to minimise the time between assessment of 
the inventions and the priority date. For a high proportion of the cases expedited 
examination was requested.9 The oldest priority date was 1998, but 58 of the cases 
had priority dates in 2002 or later.  
All these cases were assessed for their inventiveness using an economic yardstick – a 
new knowledge contribution. This yardstick was noted by the UK Appeals Court when 
evaluating the proposed 4-step test for patentable subject matter.10 The question 
asked was "what has the inventor really added to human knowledge?" This is an 
asymmetrically different test from the test used by patent offices and patent courts – 
"is it obvious?" Within current patent law if an invention is not ruled out by the "is it 
obvious" test, then it is assumed to be inventive. This is like asking the question "is X 
beautiful?" and answering it in the affirmative after considering the question "is X 
ugly?" and finding that X is not ugly. If obvious is used in the very narrow definition of 
patent law,11 and inventive has its ordinary meaning, it is clear that there may well be 
a very large set of products and processes which are not obvious in patent law but 
which are not inventive in the ordinary meaning of the word.12  
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Inventiveness, like beauty is a continuum. The policy challenge is to set the 
patentability threshold at a point along this continuum where benefits to the public 
fully offset the costs of the monopoly grant.13 The patent system treats inventiveness 
as a dichotomy,14 falling into the trap of treating that which is not obvious as 
sufficiently inventive to merit a patent grant.  
The economic yardstick of a new knowledge contribution targets a point along the 
continuum which balances costs and benefits from the patent system. Where there is 
new knowledge there may also be spillover benefits to offset patent costs. This 
yardstick is similar to social contract theory which requires that, to be patentable, an 
invention delivers some social value.15 The inventive concept in each case was 
construed from the claims. It was then assessed against existing knowledge at the 
priority date. Finally the difference between existing knowledge and the inventive 
concept was assessed to identify the new contribution to human knowledge. It was 
difficult to discern any new knowledge in any of the 72 patented inventions.16 While 
there may be special factors in the business method field, the absence of new 
knowledge in the selected cases reinforces earlier evidence about the very low height 
of the inventive step. The analysis presented here addresses the question of why such 
low quality inventions pass the inventiveness test. The discussion commences with the 
issue of identifying relevant existing knowledge – the dimension where business 
methods may differ from other technology fields. 
Among the 72 inventions in the dataset only eight did not have parallel overseas 
applications. The majority had parallel applications at the USPTO and the EPO. Overall 
54 cases have been traced through examination at the USPTO,17 and 38 at the EPO.18 
The documented exchanges between applicants and examiners at the APO, the USPTO 
and the EPO are used to identify the reasons for grant of these patents. 
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Existing knowledge readily identifiable for most applications 
There were only three cases where no novelty or inventiveness objections were raised 
by an examiner at any of the three offices.19 In two further cases EPO examiners 
rejected the inventions for lack of inventiveness based on common general knowledge. 
For this set of applications from the period 2003-06, clearly there was substantial 
relevant documented knowledge. Sixty-nine cases were initially rejected by at least 
one office for want of novelty or inventiveness. There were initial examiner objections 
on inventiveness grounds in 44 of 71 cases in Australia,20 and in 31 of 38 cases at the 
EPO.21 In the USA there were obviousness objections in all but one of the 54 parallel 
applications, with 20 cases being rejected three or more times. 
The surprising finding, from an economic perspective, was that many so closely related 
patents had already been granted and that the closely related identified knowledge 
was not sufficient to lead to rejection of the application. What then were the rules and 
procedures that led to grant?  
New combinations 
Combinations of known elements (integers) provide particular challenges for patent 
systems. A doctrine developed to ensure that uninventive combinations were not 
granted patents was the synergy doctrine. This test requires that a new combination of 
known elements provide either an unexpected outcome or a result that was greater 
than the sum of the parts to be deemed inventive. In the USA this test was detailed as 
the critical issue in determining whether a combination patent was obvious by the 
Supreme Court in 196922 and re-emphasised in 1976.23 The synergy test is still used 
under the European Patent Convention (EPC).  
But in Australia it was abandoned in favour of the suggestion test – that a new 
combination of known elements is inventive unless there is a written suggestion to use 
such a combination – in 1980.24 In the USA the CAFC first over-rode the Supreme 
Court's views on the synergy test in 1983,25 on the grounds that it was not written into 
the 1952 Patent Act.26 In 1984 the CAFC introduced the "teaching, suggestion or 
motivation" test (the "suggestion" test).27 The suggestion test requires there to be a 
specific reference in the existing allowable knowledge ('prior art') that suggests 
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combining the specific elements. Without such a suggestion a combination of known 
elements cannot be held obvious. Clearly this doctrine substantially decreases the 
likelihood that a combination of known elements will be found obvious / uninventive.  
Nearly a quarter of a century later (2007) the Supreme Court considered a patent case 
and reversed the CAFC decision on KSR, reminding the CAFC that the decisions in 
Anderson’s-Black Rock and Sakraida remained binding law. After re-emphasising the 
importance of the synergy test, the Court also agreed that the suggestion test might 
prove useful in some circumstances, but was not the sole test, nor should it be applied 
rigidly.28 There is some evidence that the KSR decision has marginally increased the 
likelihood of a litigated patent being found obvious, though the standard for 
inventiveness – if measured by the proportion of litigated patents found obvious – 
remains far below the standard in pre-CAFC days.29  
Among the 72 cases, 41 were combinations of known processes of which 21 simply 
involved combination of an existing process with a computer. A typical business 
method 'invention' sets out a number of steps which, as a whole, deliver a service to a 
customer. This type of process is different to many of the technology-based processes 
for which the patent system was designed. The difference is vividly illustrated by the 
frequency with which patent examiners found multiple inventive concepts when a 
business analyst would find none: 
• In a business process for selecting pre-qualified suppliers through an auction 
process, the USPTO found that the normal and reverse auction versions were 
separate inventions.30 A business perspective would consider these obvious 
alternatives. 
• The EPO examiner found two 'inventions' in a software process for scheduling 
deliveries to an electronically locked box – scheduling a delivery time and 
managing delivery of different sized goods.31 Yet the invention was nothing more 
than the computerised mental steps in the age-old process of delivering goods.  
• An application for a reverse mortgage product – with different methods for 
calculating the outstanding balance – was found to contain three different 
inventive concepts in Australia. All three acceptances were opposed, and the 
division into multiple separate 'inventions' simply increased the costs to the 
business opposing the grants.32 Reverse mortgage products had been on the 
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market for some time when this application was filed in May 2005 and the 
methods for calculating repayment did not indicate any advance in knowledge.  
The EPO retains the synergy approach to assessing combinations, and the dataset 
contains examples where this doctrine has allowed the rejection of trivial applications. 
For example in rejecting a software process for automating pharmaceutical dispensing 
after checking identity using biometric data, the EPO examiner advised the applicant 
that "… no combined synergistic effect is produced … Hence the combination of these 
three features amounts to a mere aggregation which is obvious …".33 It seems 
surprising that a similar approach was not taken in the case of delivering to a locked 
electronic box.  
But in the USA and Australia the suggestion doctrine ties examiners' hands and case 
law prevents them rejecting inventions which contain no new knowledge. There were 
three cases where neither the APO nor the USPTO raised any novelty or inventiveness 
objections, but such objections were raised by EPO examiners. These include a linked 
database invention for monitoring goods from manufacturer through retailer to final 
purchaser;34 Accenture's invention for computerising the steps involved in 
implementing a new IT system in a business;35 and a software system that 
recompenses users for watching advertisements, which combines known processes 
with modern electronic networks.36 
Another strategy used by examiners in assessing whether an application can be 
rejected as obvious is the "problem/solution" approach. This works by identifying the 
problem proposed, without reference to the solution in the application. Then existing 
knowledge is used to assess whether the problem can be solved in a manner similar to 
the proposed claims. The approach is widely evident in these 72 cases and examiners 
frequently refer to 'the problem'. Like other doctrines developed to assess 
inventiveness, this avoids the critical question of what new knowledge or know-how is 
contributed. The approach assumes there is a problem. Often the identified problems 
do not really merit the term problem. 
One computerisation case illustrates how the "problem/solution" approach also 
contributes to the very low inventiveness standard. It also confirms the narrowness of 
the concept of a single invention in patent administration. The 'invention' is a software 
process to print documents closer to the point of delivery.37 The 'problems' were 
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established with reference to a never-granted PCT application by the same company. 
They involved such trivia as failure to verify correct address positioning. Businesses 
have been automating document deliver for decades – I personally worked on 
automated monthly invoice despatch in the USA in 1968. Delivering closer to the 
destination makes this 'invention' novel in patent terms, and useful in practical terms, 
though newspapers have been printing close to markets for decades. Given these 
known processes if 'inventive' had its ordinary meaning in patent law, this application 
would be deemed obvious. However because the application contained considerable 
detail in its 80 claims the Australian examiner was unable to document its lack of 
inventiveness. Indeed several inventive concepts were found and overall this 
application has spawned five patent grants in Australia. The USPTO also found two 
inventive concepts, but the restricted application was abandoned after two rejections 
on obviousness grounds.  
Trivial variations 
There are some legal doctrines designed to set a minimum floor to the quantum of 
inventiveness required for grant of a patent. The mechanical equivalent principle sets a 
floor to the novelty requirement and the technical equivalence (or workshop variation) 
principles set a parallel floor to the inventive step requirement. These old doctrines 
have not been used effectively to prevent grant of patents to any of the trivial 
inventions in the dataset.  
The patents in the dataset contained 18 cases where the most accurate designation of 
the 'invention' was trivial difference.38 Thirteen of these cases had parallel USPTO 
applications and the US examiner initially rejected all 13 applications. Finally six were 
granted.  
One of the US grants is a case where encrypted fingerprint data are used to 
authenticate identity prior to making a financial transaction. The claims are actually for 
a software process for checking identity. They do not cover any aspect of fingerprint 
encryption. The claims treat the encrypted fingerprint material as a piece of data – an 
authentication code. Indeed the argument during examination in both Australia (two 
rejections) and the USA (eight rejections before grant) was over the location of the 
encrypted fingerprints. In both jurisdictions grant finally revolved around the fact that 
the encrypted data were stored at a location different from that identified in 
previously patented systems. So it seems that a simple change in location generates 
sufficient inventiveness for a patent monopoly. It is hard to identify any benefit to the 
public from such a low standard.  
Other examples of trivial patents in the dataset include: 
• A method for early repayment of a home equity loan where the bank wins either 
way (the repayment amount is the current value of the asset if the value has 
increased, but not if it has decreased); 
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• A real estate website where icons on a map can be clicked to show the view from 
that point; and 
• A system for assessing organisational performance using software which stores a 
user-defined organisational structure, imports productivity data, and maps this to 
the organisational structure using a configuration table. 
Ten trivial difference cases had EPO parallels – two remain pending, two have been 
granted and three were abandoned or withdrawn. The remaining three have been 
refused (two of these have outstanding appeals). Both the granted cases were initially 
refused as not technically inventive, but were then granted after very minor 
amendments – largely moving words from dependent to independent claims. These 
cases are discussed below when considering the issue of semantics in achieving patent 
grant.  
Analogous use 
Another doctrine designed to set a floor to the quantum of inventiveness required for 
patent grant is the analogous use doctrine. This long-standing rule seems to be rarely 
used to reject business method patents in either the USA or Australia. The famous 
Amazon one-click patent simply used the ages old process of running a customer 
account in an internet selling environment. Clearly this invention applied a well-known 
process to "an operation which is exactly analogous to what was done before."39  
Within the dataset are three cases where the analogous use doctrine should perhaps 
have applied: 
• A system for providing lottery winnings to purchasers of the magazines (all the 
elements of the claim are identical to lottery ticket processes, except that the 
initiating purchase is a magazine not a lottery ticket);40 
• Benchmarking the environmental sustainability of residential construction 
projects;41 and 
• Using audit techniques to monitor the use of chemicals in agricultural products.42 
Both benchmarking and audit are standard evaluation processes designed for use in a 
wide variety of environments. It would therefore seem particularly appropriate to use 
the analogous use doctrine to reject these applications as not obvious. While lottery 
systems are not in themselves designed for use in other environments, when a process 
that is identical to that in common use in lotteries is applied in another environment 
there does not appear to be any benefit to the public, and certainly there is no new 
knowledge contribution. Again the analogous use doctrine would seem, at least from 
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an economic perspective, to be an appropriate basis on which to reject such an 
application for want of inventiveness.  
Amendment 
While the suggestion doctrine for combinations and the apparent non-use of the 
analogous use doctrine set a very low floor to inventiveness, continual amendment 
means even the most trivial 'invention' can be redrafted to become patent-eligible. 
The simplicity of redrafting to overcome a novelty objection is well known. A small 
change in wording suffices – often the addition or deletion of one feature (integer). 
The full weight of eliminating uninventive inventions therefore falls on the 
inventiveness test. 
But the cases in this dataset show how amendment usually succeeds in overcoming 
inventiveness objections. The minimum quantum of inventiveness seems to be only a 
very small difference rather than any ingenuity or new knowledge. A trivial 
amendment – often unrelated to the 'inventive concept' – overcomes inventiveness 
objections. Minor design features can be added to ensure that a specific combination 
of old elements passes the inventiveness test. Examples are: 
• user specification of conditions, for example of the anomalous events about which 
a bank sends alert messages;43 
• specific actors, for example use of shippers (freight forwarders) for checking buyer 
credit-worthiness in a software system where goods are temporarily removed from 
stock while buyer credit is checked, then shipped or returned to inventory 
depending on the outcome of the credit check;44  
• removal of specific features, for example a patent for the combined store and 
credit card was granted because of minute design variations, including the 
argument that the combination had fewer features than existing combined cards;45 
and 
• unrelated computer processes, for example a server going to standby mode in a 
software system for remote monitoring of dialysis data.46 
The narrowness of these grant-achieving amendments confirms that far from there 
being an inventive step there is simply a requirement for a trivial difference. In earlier 
times this might have been called a workshop variation.  
Astonishingly these changes can involve removing features or narrowing the scope of 
the claims. Outside the patent world the idea that a process which is not inventive 
might become inventive by reducing its scope seems laughable. Not in the patent 
world. Often the scope is narrowed by adding a normal feature of computer 
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operations – use of a satellite communications gateway (system for allocating patients 
to emergency treatment facilities);47 an interface (mapping business data48 and back-
office invoicing process);49 an update schedule (internet bookmarks);50 or converting 
dates into binary code51 (diary event management).52 While each of these inventions 
was deemed uninventive prior to the narrowing in scope, the addition of these trivial 
unrelated features was critical in passing the threshold test for inventiveness.  
In 50 out of 72 cases the claims were amended at least once during their processing in 
Australia. At the USPTO frequent amendment was also evident – as was repeated 
rejection. While it was rare for an Australian examiner to reject a trivial application 
more than twice, at the USPTO there were two cases with eight rejection notices on 
file. Of the 51 finalised cases USPTO examiners rejected nine applications five or more 
times and ten applications three or four times. In most cases amendment followed. 
The EPO has a more controlled process, where the norm is only two examiner reports. 
Nonetheless of the four cases granted by the EPO three were initially rejected as not 
inventive, but when words were moved from dependent to independent claims they 
magically passed the inventiveness threshold. Clearly the procedure by which 
applicants have many opportunities to amend applications does not contribute to the 
economic goals of the patent system, at least in these cases.  
Semantics not substance 
While using clear specific language is important, patent attorneys and judges have 
taken shades of meaning to a new depth. The use of semantics rather than substance 
to achieve patent grant is not new – Edwards remarked on it in 1949.53 Nowadays 
semantics are used to evade statutory and doctrinal subject matter exclusions. Indeed 
the appropriate wording to evade the prohibition on patenting second uses of medical 
uses of known substances was designed by the Swiss Patent Office.54  
These cases include a number of examples where USPTO objections as to non-
patentable subject matter are evaded by simply rewording the claims (for example, 
computer programs or the requirement for a transformation). In several cases the 
examiner advises the applicant how to redraft their claims to make the unpatentable 
eligible for a monopoly grant.55  
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 Particularly at the USPTO examiners often assist applicants to redraft claims so that they become 
patentable. In the isolated world of the patent community – where gaining a patent seems to trump all 
11 
The most astounding aspect of the role of semantics in patent law’s inventiveness 
definition is that the simple act of moving words from dependent to independent 
claims creates inventiveness where previously there was none. This magic happens in 
all offices and can overcome EPO objections that an application has no technical 
element of inventiveness. Of the four cases granted by the EPO, three were initially 
rejected for want of technical inventiveness. In each of these three cases grant 
followed the movement of words from dependent to independent claims: 
• when the words "wherein the stored fingerprint is in an encrypted format" were 
moved from claim 2 to claim 1 a patent was granted for a software process for 
checking identity prior to allowing access to a financial system;56 
• the EPO's initial rejection of a linked database system for monitoring data on 
temperature and shocks for goods in transit initially identified that nothing about 
the claims was inventive as "any data processing apparatus inherently and 
coercively implies data collection means", going on to list the range of possible 
input devices. But when the applicant moved words from claim 4 to claim 1 that 
the data were provided by "a data logger arranged to sense data corresponding to 
the predetermined condition of the goods" a patent was granted. The invention 
does not cover any aspect of collecting temperature or shock data – it merely 
provides such data in a form accessible to a range of users;57 and 
• a software process for networking apparatus on an outdoor work site was assessed 
by the EPO to be "activation of a module to manage an item over a network" and 
was rejected as obvious because (among other reasons) URLs are by definition a 
hierarchical structure. The applicant then moved words from dependent claims 3 
and 8 into the independent claims and added minor detail to claim 1 (for example 
that the outdoor worksite has an office). A patent was granted.58 
The ease with which semantics can be used to evade patent law has led many to 
consider it advisable not to take such actions as writing specific subject matter 
exclusions into patent statutes. This was, for example, a major reason for the UK Swan 
committee recommending that the UK abandon it's exclusion of pharmaceutical 
products from patentability.59 However over recent decades substantial progress has 
been made in tax law in working out how to draft legislation to respond flexibly and 
                                                                                                                                               
other matters – there does not appear to be any concern that using semantics to get round a legal 
prohibition is a form of undermining the law. Australian examiners also help applicants gain monopolies 
– for example by drawing their attention to overseas granted versions which have narrower claims.  
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12 
successfully to attempts to evade payment of tax. Both tax and patent systems are 
characterised by high returns to wealthy organisations or individuals if they are able to 
game the system. In patent law semantics are the equivalent of creative accounting in 
tax law. In tax law overarching principles, including an anti-avoidance principle, can be 
used to trump specific rules where these are in conflict. This allows actions which 
undermine the purpose of the law to be disallowed.60 Such an approach could usefully 
be imported into patent law.  
Conclusion 
The cases discussed here vividly illustrate how far the patent law definition of 
inventiveness differs from the ordinary meaning of the term.  
The shift in the USA and Australia from the synergy to the suggestions test has been an 
important factor in leading to a fall in the standard of inventiveness. Despite the KSR 
decision the height of the nonobviousness standard in the USA remains low.61 While in 
theory the EPO's inventive step should be higher because the synergy test has been 
retained for combinations, the cases in this study show that even at the EPO patents 
are granted for inventions which contain no new knowledge. The central reason for 
the very low height to the inventive step is that neither patent offices nor courts focus 
on the central question of "what new knowledge has been added?" The low standard 
created by the "is it obvious?" approach is reinforced by continual amendment, non-
use of doctrines designed to set a floor to the required quantum of inventiveness and 
use of semantics rather than substance to indicate 'inventiveness'. Outside the patent 
world the idea that an uninventive invention can become inventive simply by re-
ordering words seems nothing but smoke and mirrors. The idea that if an uninventive 
invention is reduced in scope it can then acquire inventiveness is profoundly surreal – 
belonging perhaps in a world where the emperor wears no clothes.  
Patent policy is (or could be) an important tool for supporting genuine innovation. 
Innovation is critical to a healthy and competitive economy. The inventiveness test 
carries the full weight of balancing costs and benefits in patent policy. The evidence 
presented here reinforces earlier studies and strongly suggests that the current body 
of case law needs to be set aside and replaced by a requirement for new knowledge. 
Preferably this should be for a quantum of new knowledge that is at least a moderate, 
if not a significant, advance over what is already known. 
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